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Abstract 
We extend the New Keynesian Monetary Policy literature relaxing the assumption that the decisions 
are taken by a single policymaker, considering instead that monetary policy decisions are taken 
collectively in a committee. We introduce a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), whose members 
have different preferences between output and inflation variability and have to vote on the level of the 
interest rate. This paper helps to explain interest rate smoothing from a political economy point of 
view, in which MPC members face a bargaining problem on the level of the interest rate. In this 
framework, the interest rate is a non-linear reaction function on the lagged interest rate and the 
expected inflation. This result comes from a political equilibrium in which there is a strategic 
behaviour of the agenda setter with respect to the rest of the MPC’s members. Our approach can also 
reproduce both features documented by the empirical evidence on interest rate smoothing: a) the 
modest response of the interest rate to inflation and output gap; and b) the dependence on lagged 
interest rate; features that are difficult to reproduce in standard New Keynesian models all together. It 
also provides a theoretical framework on how disagreement among policymakers can slow down the 
adjustment on interest rates and on “menu costs” in interest rate decisions. Furthermore, a numerical 
exercise shows that this inertial behaviour of the interest rate is internalised by the economic agents 
through an increase in expected inflation. 
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1 Introduction
An existing puzzle in the optimal monetary policy literature is why, in practice, central banks
change the interest rate less often than the theory predicts. This feature is called interest rate
smoothing and it is well documented for many central banks1. For instance, Lowes and Ellis
(1997), in a study for different countries, listed as the common patterns in official interest rates
set by central banks: they change rarely, they are made in a sequence of steps in the same
direction, and they are left unchanged for relatively long periods of time before moving in the
opposite direction.
Regarding interest rates reaction functions, Taylor (1993) proposed a policy rule for the
interest rate, modelled by a linear combination of output gap and inflation, as a rough de-
scription of the monetary policy for the USA during the chairmanship of Alan Greenspan. On
the other hand, some authors, such as Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Clarida and others (1999)
and Orphanides (2003), have pointed out that, empirically, the monetary policy rule that best
captures the data has the following form:
it = (1− ρ)
(
i+ φpipit + φxxt
)
+ ρit−1 + t
where i is a constant, interpretable as the steady state nominal interest rate. pit and xt are
the inflation and output gap, respectively. ρ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that reflects the degree
of lagged dependence in the interest rate. In these estimations, interest rate smoothing is
present in two ways. Firstly, the estimated coefficients φpi and φx are typically smaller than
the optimal rule would suggest; and secondly, the partial adjustment to movements in pit and
xt is reflected by the presence of it−1. In other words, the empirical form of the official interest
rate is a weighted average of some desired value that depends on the state of the economy and
on the lagged interest rate. Also, the estimates of ρ are on the order of 0.7 or 0.9 for quarterly
data, which indicates a very slow adjustment in practice.
The existing literature that explains interest rate smoothing has three branches. The first
explanation relies on the effects of uncertainty on the policy decisions. Uncertainty about
the structure and the state of the economy can lead to lower response of the interest rate to
shocks. An early work by William Brainard (1967) showed that uncertainty on the parameters
of the economy’s equations reduces policy activism, which means a more cautious response
to shocks. In more recent papers the actions taken by policymakers are those with outcomes
that they are confident about. For that reason, they delay action until they collect enough
information about a shock. On the other hand, Clarida and others (1999) argue that model
uncertainty may help to explain the fairly low variability of interest rate in the data. However,
they consider that it does not capture the feature of strong lagged dependence in the interest
rate.
A second explanation, given by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) can help to explain the
lagged dependence feature. Their argument is based on the effects of the short-term interest
rates on the aggregate demand through the effect on long-term interest rates. Being long-term
interest rates those that affect aggregate demand. Lagged dependence in short-term interest
rates allows the central bank to manipulate long-term rates with more modest movements
in the short-term rate than otherwise needed. Therefore, the central bank may care about
avoiding excessive volatility in the short-term interest rate in pursuing its stabilisation goal.
In the same context, Goodhart (1999) and Woodford (1999) argue that inertial monetary
1See Sack and Wieland (2000) for a discussion on interest rate smoothing.
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policy makes the future path of short-term interest rates more predictable and increases policy
effectiveness. These authors provide a reasonable explanation for lagged dependence on interest
rate. However, it is still to be seen if this story can account as well for the empirically modest
response of the short-term rate to inflation and output gap.
A third explanation is based on financial markets stability. It considers that large move-
ments in the interest rate are avoided because they destabilise financial markets (Goodfriend
1991). Therefore, by changing policy rates gradually central banks can reduce the likelihood
that a change in policy triggers excessive reactions. In a forward-looking environment with
rational expectations, concern about the variance of the interest rate induces interest rate
smoothing.
Among other explanations, Clarida and others (1999) argue that disagreement among policy
makers is another explanation for slow adjustment rates. However, they consider that this story
has not yet been well developed and this is where we want to provide an alternative framework.
The current literature on interest rate smoothing, as well as most of the literature on optimal
monetary policy, relies on the assumption that policy decisions are taken by a single policy
maker that maximises some measure of social welfare. However, in real life this is not the case,
because in practice monetary policy decisions are taken mostly collectively, in committees.
This paper intends to explain interest rate smoothing giving more structure to the decision-
making process, in which policy decisions are made through a Monetary Policy Committee
(MPC), whose members have different preferences. This paper helps to explain interest rate
smoothing from a political economy point of view, in which members of an MPC have a
bargaining problem on the interest rate. In this framework, the political equilibrium interest
rate is a function of the lagged interest rate and expected inflation. We have found that when
the difference between expected inflation and its long run value is relatively high, the interest
rate reacts as the optimal monetary policy predicts. However, the smaller the difference, the
interest rate reacts less than the optimal or does not react at all.
The literature on Monetary Policy Committees is fairly new and it has focused mainly
on how the structure of an MPC can affect the policy decisions. It has two branches, the
first branch considers the case of members with different preferences and how this affects
expectations formation and policy outcomes2. The second branch of the literature of MPCs
has focused on the differences in skills among members and how it interacts with different
voting rules3.
Considering the existing literature on MPCs, this research is closer to Riboni’s (2003)
and Riboni and Ruge-Murcia’s (2006). In Riboni’s model, a committee with heterogeneous
preferences can work as a substitute of a commitment technology when there is dynamic
bargaining among members. In this model, the member in charge of setting the agenda to
vote is less willing to deviate from the optimal time-consistent inflation level, because it will
2Aksoy, De Grauwe and Dewachter (2002) and Von Hagen and Su¨ppel (1994) have worked on the case
of a monetary union in which, because of nationality, the members have different goals regarding the level of
inflation and output gap. Riboni (2003) and Silbert (2004) show that in a committee with members with different
inflation targets, the policymaker’s capacity to bring down surprise inflation is reduced. Waller (1989) showed
that assigning the task of conducting monetary policy to a committee with staggered membership enhances
continuity in expectations formation and reduces inflation.
3Gersbach and Hahn (2001) showed that less skilled policymakers in general want to abstain from voting.
If a voting record is published, they try to mimic their more skilful colleagues; therefore voting records can
be undesirable. Karotkin (1996) analysed the performance of different voting rules in committees in which
individual skills differ. Berk and Bierut (2003) introduce the effects of learning on the performance of voting
rules. In a new strand of the literature, Gerlach-Kristen (2003b, 2004, 2006a) studies the effects of uncertainty
about the state of the economy when the members have the same skills.
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reduce her negotiation power next period. This model has a voting mechanism similar to
ours, in which there exists an agenda-setter that every period submits a policy to vote, but it
differs from us in the type of heterogeneity and on the dynamics of the model. Riboni works
on heterogeneity in inflation goals, whilst we work on heterogeneity in the relative weights
in the preferences between output gap and inflation among members. Also, Riboni’s model
is dynamic from a political economy point of view, but its economic structure is static since
there are no shocks that affect the economy differently every period. In other work, Riboni and
Ruge-Murcia (2006) introduce a dynamic voting model, where forward looking policymakers
make decisions taking into account the consequences of changing the status quo, which also
generates interest rate smoothing.
Our model relaxes the traditional assumption that monetary policy decisions are made by
a single policy maker and introduces strategic decisions in an MPC with heterogeneous prefer-
ences. This approach is new in the interest rate smoothing literature and helps to explain this
problem through a different channel, from a political economy point of view. It also provides a
theoretical framework on how disagreement among policymakers can slow the adjustment on
interest rates and on adjustment costs or ”menu costs” in interest rate decisions.
Moreover, this model can also reproduce altogether both features of interest rate smoothing,
which are the modest response of the interest rate to inflation and output gap and the lagged
dependence. These are features that other models fail to reproduce at the same time. In our
model, when lagged interest rates are close to the current period optimum, they do not change
because it is costly to have an agreement among members. Only when the size of the shocks
is such that it is sub-optimal to keep the interest rate, it will be changed. However, in other
cases the change will be below the optimal, in the exact size necessary to obtain a coalition
for passing the new interest rate, or equal to the optimal, when the expected inflation is high
enough that make the status quo sub-optimal.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The second section presents the benchmark
model in the spirit of the New Keynesian monetary economics. The third section introduces
the policy decision problem in an MPC with members with heterogeneous preferences and
solves the political economy problem. The fourth section presents some stylised facts on the
voting process for some MPCs in relation with its effects on interest rate adjustments. The
last section concludes.
2 Benchmark Model
During the past years, it has been a broad use of theoretical models of monetary policy based on
the techniques of general equilibrium theory. On this literature, the New Keynesian approach
departs from the real business cycle theory with the explicit incorporation of nominal price
rigidities. These models are fairly simple and have some qualitative core features that are
suitable to evaluate monetary policy. In order of being able to compare our results with the
existing literature, we depart from a baseline framework for the analysis of monetary policy
based on a New Keynesian perspective. In this section we develop our benchmark model with a
single policymaker, which follows closely Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) andWoodford (2003).
In the next section we will analyse the policy problem under a Monetary Policy Committee
with members with heterogeneous preferences in which the interest rate is determined in a
political equilibrium.
We assume a closed economy; all the variables are expressed as log deviations from the
steady state. The economic equilibrium in this economy is given by the intersection of the
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aggregate demand (AD) and the aggregate supply (AS). As in any standard macroeconomic
model, the aggregate demand is determined by ”IS” and ”LM” equilibrium. In our model the
”IS” relates the output gap inversely to the real interest rate and the ”LM” is represented
by the nominal interest rate chosen by the central bank as policy instrument. The aggregate
supply (AS) is represented by the Phillips curve, which relates the inflation positively to the
output gap. These two equations can be obtained from a standard general equilibrium model
with price frictions. We can summarise the economy by two equations, the ”IS” and the ”AS”,
that have the following form4:
xt = −ϕ [it − Etpit+1 − rnt ] + Etxt+1 (IS)
pit = λxt + βEtpit+1 + ut (AS)
where pit and xt are the period t inflation and output gap it and rnt are the nominal and the
natural interest rate 5. All the variables are expressed as log-deviations from their long-run
level. According to the IS, lower real interest rate and higher future output increases current
output. On the other hand, in the Phillips curve the output gap variable captures movements
in marginal costs associated with changes in excess demand and the shock ut captures anything
else that might affect expected marginal costs. ut is usually named as a ”cost push” shock
and it is related to supply shocks that do not affect the potential output. Moreover, ut gives a
trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilisation. We assume the disturbance term ut
follow:
ut = ρut−1 + εt
where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and εt is an i.i.d. random variables with zero mean and variance σ2u.
We assume, following much of the literature on optimal monetary policy, that the policy
objective is a quadratic function of the target variables xt and pit and takes the form of:
W = −1
2
Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
βs
[
αx2t+s + pi
2
t+s
]}
(1)
where the parameter α is the relative weight on output deviations. This loss function takes
potential output and zero inflation rate as the targets for the deviations of output and inflation
from the deterministic long-run trend. During the past years have been some works on deriving
the policy problem from first principles. Rotemberg andWoodford (1997) andWoodford (2003)
show that an objective function of the form of (1) can be obtained as a quadratic approximation
of the utility-based welfare6. Though, this works rely on some assumptions, like representative
agent economy, which can be a restrictive representation of how the preferences over inflation
and output gap really are. However, they are useful to establish the policy problem from the
4The IS equation can obtained from log-linearising the Euler equation from the household’s optimal con-
sumption decisions. The Phillips curve can be obtained from aggregating the log-linear approximation of the
individual firm pricing decisions. The price friction in this model comes from staggered nominal price setting
in the essence Taylor (1979). The most common formulation of staggered price setting in the literature comes
from Calvo (1983), in which he assumes that in any given period a firm has fixed probability of keeping its price
fixed during the period.
5The natural interest rate is defined as the equilibrium real rate of return in the case of fully flexible prices.
6In these works the output gap is included in the welfare function, because the volatility of income reduces
welfare. On the other hand, inflation is included because, as firms face uncertainty on the time when they are
going to be able to adjust their price, higher aggregate inflation increases the volatility of the individual price
and income.
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welfare criterion. Moreover, Woodford (2003) shows that the weight α is a function of the
primitive parameters of the model, such as the slope of the Phillips curve and the degree of
monopolistic competition.
2.1 The Policy Problem for a Single Policymaker
In this part we assume that the policy decisions are taken by a single policymaker. We further
assume the policymaker is unable to commit their future policies; therefore he cannot change
the private sector expectations with policy announcements over future policy decisions. In
each period the policy maker chooses the policy instrument to maximise the welfare function
subject to the IS and the AS. The policymaker’s problem can be summarised by maximising
the Bellman equation:
max
{xt,pit}
Wt = −12
[
αx2t + pi
2
t
]
+ βEtWt+1
subject to
xt = −ϕ [it − Etpit+1 − rnt ] + Etxt+1
pit = λxt + βEtpit+1 + ut
where EtWt+1 = W t+1 is taken as given by the Policymaker, since her cannot credibly ma-
nipulate beliefs in the absence of commitment. Moreover, in order to obtain tractability on
the problem, we focus on the optimum within a simple family of policy rules, which is a linear
function of expected inflation.
Proposition 1 The optimal feedback policy for the interest rate, within the family rules men-
tioned above without commitment, is :
it = rnt + φpiEtpit+1
where φpi = 1 +
(1−ρ)λ
ρϕα > 1.
See appendix D for a derivation. According to this policy rule, the nominal interest rate
should rise in response to a rise in expected inflation, and that increase should be high enough
to increase real rates. In other words, in the optimal rule for the nominal interest rate, the
coefficient on expected inflation should exceed unity (that is φpi > 1)7.
Moreover, in this policy rule, the interest rate is adjusted to perfectly offset shocks that
affect the natural interest rate, but to partially offset cost-push shocks (that is ∂pit/∂ut >
0).. Therefore, when ”cost-push” shocks are present, the optimal policy rule incorporates
convergence of inflation to its target over time. Also, the relative weight between output and
inflation stabilisation is given by the parameter alpha.
7In contrast, in the case of a single policymaker that can commit to a policy rule, and if the policy rule is
linear on the shocks, the optimal feedback policy rule has the following form:
it = r
n
t + γ
c
piEtpit+1
where γcpi = 1 +
(1−ρ)λ
ρϕαc
≥ γpi because αc = α (1− βρ) < α. See Clarida and others (1999) for a derivation.
Therefore, commitment increases the effectiveness of monetary policy, reducing expected inflation.
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3 The Policy Problem in a Monetary Policy Committee
The traditional approach on the optimal monetary policy literature relies on the assumption
that decisions are taken by a single policymaker. However, in real-life this is not the case,
because in practice monetary policy decisions are taken mostly collectively in a committee.
In this section we introduce a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in charge of the monetary
policy decisions. Also, we assume that the members in the MPC differ in their preferences.
More precisely, they have different relative weight between output and inflation stabilisation
in their policy objectives 8.
We assume the MPC has three members 9, j = {1, 2, 3}, each one with different preference
parameters: α1 < α2 < α3. The first (third) member is the most (least) conservative, while the
second has moderate preferences over inflation and output gap. Therefore, the aggressiveness
in the response of the interest rate to expected inflation decreases with the index of each
member.
3.1 Bargaining problem
We assume the policy decision is a bargaining problem in the spirit of Baron and Ferejohn
(1989), which is closer to how the interest rate is decided in practise by an MPC. In every
period the interest rate is determined by the following game: one member, the agenda setter,
proposes a new interest rate. Then, the members of the MPC vote. We assume that it is
necessary a simple majority to have the new interest rate approved. Then, the new interest
rate is implemented if at least two out of three members of the MPC approve it, otherwise the
last period interest rate is maintained.
In this voting system the status quo is given by last period interest rate, it means that this
is the default interest rate if the members do not accept the new interest rate proposed by the
agenda setter. Moreover, because the agenda setter makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal, she
has a first mover advantage, which in this setup gives her more bargaining power than to the
other MPC’s members. Therefore, the agenda setter can strategically set to vote an interest
rate that maximises her own utility constrained by the reaction of other members. Denote the
identity of the agenda setter by A, her optimisation problem becomes:
max
{it}
WAt = −
1
2
[
αAx2t + pi
2
t
]
+ βEtWAt+1 (2)
subject to
xt = −ϕ [it − Etpit+1 − rnt ] + Etxt+1 (3)
pit = λxt + βEtpit+1 + ut
and to
WAt (it) ≥ WAt (it−1) (4)
W jt (it) ≥ W jt (it−1) for at least one j 6= A
8We work on the heterogeneity in the weights but not on heterogeneity on the targets. Heterogeneity on
targets gives different inflation bias among members, whilst the degree of adjustment of the interest rate to
shocks is the same for every member. In other words, with heterogeneity on targets the members only differ on
the level of the interest rate, and this difference is independent of the type and size of shocks
9We assume a committee of three members because this is the minimum odd number of members in order
to have a conflict.
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The problem for the agenda setter is similar to the benchmark model, but with an extra
constraint. Within an MPC, the agenda setter has to choose an interest rate such that also
obtains the majority needed for approval. This problem includes some participation constraints
on the behaviour of the other members. According to these participation constraints, the new
interest rate should give at least the same utility than the status quo for the agenda setter and
at least one additional member.
Since MPC members have different preferences over output and inflation stabilisation, there
is a conflict on the size of the adjustment of the interest rate to ”cost-push” shocks. For this
reason, the political economy solution will depend on the size and direction of the shocks.
When shocks affecting the natural rate are big relatively to ”cost-push” shocks (ut), there is
no conflict among members since their preferred interest rates are similar. However, in the
opposite case, when the ”cost-push” shock are big relatively to shocks affecting the natural
rate, the MPC’s members have different preferences on the policy instrument. In that case, the
political economy solution will depend on the state variable it−1 and the shocks. For simplicity,
in order to describe easily the mechanism, we will focus in the case where there are no shocks
affecting the natural rate, that is we assume rnt = 0.
3.2 MPC members’ reaction functions
Since MPC’s members cannot credibly manipulate beliefs in the absence of commitment, they
take private sector expectations as given when solving their optimisation problem10. Therefore,
as in the case of section 5.2, the private sector forms beliefs rationally conditional on the MPC’s
reaction function. Given absence of commitment, member j′s preferences are given by
W jt = −
1
2
[
αjx
2
t + pi
2
t
]
+ βEtW
j
t+1
where EtW
j
t+1 are taken as given. Therefore, similar to the case of the previous section, her
preferences are maximised by ij∗t , the member-j optimal rate:
ij∗t = φ
j
piEtpit+1
where φjpi = 1+
(1−ρ)λ
ρϕαj
11. This optimal rate is similar to the rate in the single policymaker case
for α = αj . Moreover, given the ordering of the preference parameter αj , the responsiveness
of the interest rate to expected inflation diminishes with the index j : that is φ3pi < φ
2
pi < φ
1
pi.
Then, the more conservative a MPC member is, the stronger she prefers the interest rate to
react to expected inflation.
Conditional on the shocks, the welfare function for every MPC member is strictly concave
in the interest rate, which is maximised at the member-j optimal rate it = i
j∗
t . The concavity
comes from the quadratic preferences. Because of this concavity it is possible to define ijt , the
member-j participation rate, the interest rate that would make member j indifferent between
this rate and the status quo interest rate (it−1):
10This assumption also allow us to simplify greatly the problem, since expectations are taken as fixed by the
MPC members, the political equilibrium doesn’t depend on the rational expectations economic equilibrium.
If this were not the case, the fixed point problem would be more difficult to solve and the uniqueness of the
equilibrium is not guarantied.
11The member-j optimal rate without commitment has the following form: ij∗t = φ
j
piEtpit+1 −
1
ψ
λ
α
1
ρ
(Etpit+1 − ρpit) . However, to get the simplest result as possible, we have assumed the second element
is zero, as in the single-policymaker case when expected inflation is a linear combination of the shocks. The
results don’t change if we include the more general policy rule, but notation gets more complicated.
8
Proposition 2 Given last period interest rate, it−1, member j will be indifferent between i
j
t
and it−1 for
ijt = 2i
j∗
t − it−1
See proof in appendix D. The member-j participation rate (ijt ) gives to her the same utility
than last period rate, that is W jt
(
ijt
)
−W jt (it−1) = 0. Figure 5.1 shows the preferences over
the interest rate for member j. As we mentioned before, the welfare function is concave on the
interest rate and it is maximised at the member-j optimal rate, ij∗t . The graph shows a case
where the last period interest rate is lower than the optimal rate (that is it−1 < i
j∗
t ). According
to this case, the participation rate is higher than the optimal rate. Then, any rate between
last period’s and the participation rate will give her higher utility than the status quo. That
means that member-j will be willing to accept a rate different than the optimal rate in order to
be better off than the status quo. We can also generalise the opposite case: when last period’s
rate is on the right of member-j optimal rate, the participation rate will be on the left of last
period’s rate and any rate in between will give her higher utility than the status quo.
Figure 1: Welfare function
3.3 The policy problem
The agenda setter has a first mover advantage, because she can influence other member’s
decisions through the interest rate she sends to vote. In figure 5.2 we show one example of
how she can influence the vote of a member j. Let’s assume the status quo interest rate (it−1)
is below the agenda setter’s optimal rate (iA∗t ). The panel on the left (right) shows a case
when the agenda setter’s optimal rate is lower (higher) than member-j participation rate. In
this example the initial interest rate is low and there is an increase in expected inflation (most
likely because of a “cost-push” shock). Both members j and A want an increase in the policy
rate, but A prefers a higher increase than j. If the agenda setter’s optimal rate is not too high,
as in the case on the left, member-j will accept it. However, if it is too high, as in the case on
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the right, it violates member-j participation constraint and the best the agenda setter can do
is to set ijt that makes the constraint binding.
Figure 2: a) Policy problem when: iA∗ < ij . b) Policy problem when: iA∗ < ij .
In this subsection we analyse the optimisation problem for the agenda setter and its impli-
cations for interest rate smoothing. We show that what matters for interest rate smoothing is
the identity of the agenda setter, the degree of heterogeneity of preferences among members
and the size of the shocks. In brief, we observe interest rate smoothing only when the agenda
setter is either the first or the third member, and not when she is the second member. The
following propositions summarise our results taking into account the identity of the agenda
setter.
Proposition 3 When the agenda setter is the member with median preferences, member 2,
there is no interest rate smoothing
The policy problem when the agenda setter is the second member satisfies the median voter
theorem. In this case, she is always able to form a coalition with either the first or the third
member, to support her most preferred rate. Therefore, there is not interest rate smoothing
when the agenda setter is the member with median preferences.
Member 1 prefers a more active interest rate to reduce deviations of inflation around its
long–run value, while member 3 prefers a less active policy to reduce deviations in output gap.
The agenda setter tends to form a coalition with the first member when she needs to adjust
the interest rate because of a new shock, for instance an increase in expected inflation. But as
the shock vanishes, she tends to form a coalition with the third member to return the interest
rate closer to its neutral level.
Therefore, coalitions in the MPC vary with the sign of expected inflation and the state
variable it−1. When expected inflation is positive the agenda setter will look for a coalition
with the more conservative member (member 1) if the initial interest rate is too low. However,
if the initial interest rate is too high, she forms a coalition with the less conservative member
(member 3). A similar analysis applies when expected inflation is negative. Also, when the
size of the shocks is too high, both other members of the MPC agree with the agenda setter
to change the interest rate as her wish.
Being the agenda setter the member with median preferences would prevent interest rate
smoothing from a political economy point of view. However, this is not always the case, since
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often the most conservative member is appointed as the agenda setter. As Barro and Gordon
(1993) have pointed out, assigning the monetary policy decision task to a conservative policy-
maker can help to reduce the time inconsistency problem. However, if the decisions are taken
in an MPC, it will also induce to interest rate smoothing. We show this in the next proposition:
Proposition 4 When the agenda setter is the more conservative member, member 1,there is
interest rate smoothing and the policy function is given by:
it = it−1 when it−1 ∈ [i2∗t , i1∗t ] or it−1 ∈ [i1∗t , i2∗t ]
it = i2t when it−1 ∈ [2i2∗t − i1∗t , i2∗t ] or it−1 ∈ [i2∗t , 2i2∗t − i1∗t ]
it = i1∗t otherwise
According to this proposition, the policy function can take three different functional forms.
We present the thresholds defining the areas for those functions in terms of the optimal rates
for MPC members. These optimal rates are function of expected inflation, which at the end
also depend on the shocks and the policy decision. Therefore, the functional form of the policy
function depends on last period interest rate and the shocks.12. In the first functional form
the interest rate doesn’t change, in the second one the participation constraint for member 2
is binding and in the third one the interest rate responds the same than member-1’s optimal.
In the third area, there will be always a member that will prefer the agenda setter’s optimal
rate (i1∗t ) than the status quo rate (it−1). The agenda setter can obtain from the voting process
the same interest rate that maximises her unconstrained utility, because the participation
constraint is not binding for at least one other member. This is possible because she has the
first moving advantage in the voting process and the change in expected inflation is such that
makes the last period rate sub-optimal for the other members in comparison with i1∗t .
In the second area, the agenda setter sets an interest rate such the participation constraint
is binding for one of the members. She chooses to make binding the participation constraint
for member 2 because she has the closest preferences to hers. In such area, the agenda setter
cannot obtain from the voting process her preferred rate, but she can obtain a rate that
maximises her utility subject to the participation constraint of member 2.
The first area defines an area of inaction, where the participation rate of any member does
not satisfy the participation constraint of the agenda setter. That means, any rate that satisfy
the participation constraint of any other member would make the agenda setter worst off than
last period’s rate. Then, the agenda setter by any means would prevent to have the interest
rate changed. This area is defined when last period’s rate is between the optimal rate for
members 1 and 2. In this area, the gains from changing the rate are small in comparison to
the cost of having an agreement, so MPC members would prefer to leave it unchanged13.
The interest rate reaction function has a piecewise form with 2 thresholds and 3 zones,
and the form depends on the sign of future expected inflation. When expected inflation is
12In each row the thresholds on the left correspond to the case when expected inflation is positive (Etpit+1 > 0),
because in that case i2∗t < i
1∗
t . Similarly, the thresholds on the right are for the case when expected inflation is
negative.
13In this area, the optimal strategy for the agenda setter is to set to vote an interest rate that violates
both participation constraints of the other two members, then from the voting process the it−1 is maintained.
However, this strategic voting seems unrealistic, because the agenda setter could lose credibility requesting those
policies rates. We could also think about a more complex game, where if none of the other members agree with
the agenda setter to maintain the rate unchanged, they will have to start again a new meeting which involves
a cost. Even a small cost to keep arguing, different from zero, can make MPC members to maintain the rate
unchanged.
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positive (negative), the individual member’s optimal rates are also positive (negative) and
i1∗t > i2∗t > i3∗t (i1∗t > i2∗t > i3∗t ). The reaction function is summarised in figure 5.3. The graph
on the left shows, given positive expected inflation, in the bold line the interest rate reaction
function and in the light line the unconstrained optimal interest rate at i1∗t . Similarly, the
graphs on the right shows, also given positive expected inflation, in the bold the change in the
interest rate in period t, and in the light one the optimal change in the unconstrained case,
that is ∆it = i1∗t − it−1.
Both graphs show that there is interest rate smoothing when it−1 ∈ [2i2∗t − i1∗t , i1∗t ], because
the interest rate change less than the optimum. In this area we have two degrees of interest
rate smoothing: when it−1 ∈
[
i2∗t , i1∗t
]
the interest rate does not change at all and when
[2i2∗t − i1∗t , i1∗t ] the interest rate changes less than the optimal. In the former case, negotiating
in the MPC imposes a menu cost that makes not optimal to do small changes to the interest
rate. In the latter, the agenda setter present to vote a change smaller than the optimal, to
obtain a coalition with one of the other members, member 2.
Figure 3: Interest rate reaction function: a) it, b) ∆it
In these graphs it is possible to see that the political economy solution can explain both
features of interest rate smoothing: the modest response of the interest rate to inflation ex-
pectations and the lagged dependence. The reaction function has a smoothing area where the
interest rate either has partial adjustment or it is completely fixed. Moreover, the type of
smoothing depends on the difference between the optimal rate and the lagged interest rate.
When the difference between i1∗t and it−1 is small, the interest rate is fixed. However, when
this difference takes intermediate values the interest rate change but less than the optimal.
When this difference is big enough, the change will be equal to the optimal. Moreover, in the
absence of cost-push shocks that give a trade-off between inflation and output volatility, the
interest rate reaction function converges to i1∗t , the optimal reaction function for the agenda
setter. This is equal to the benchmark case with a single policymaker.
We can obtain a similar result in the opposite case, when the less conservative member is
appointed as the agenda setter we have:
Proposition 5 When the agenda setter is the less conservative member, member 3, there is
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interest rate smoothing and the policy function is given by:
it = it−1 when it−1 ∈ [i3∗t , i2∗t ] or it−1 ∈ [i2∗t , i3∗t ]
it = i2t when it−1 ∈ [i2∗t , 2i2∗t − i3∗t ] or it−1 ∈ [2i2∗t − i3∗t , i2∗t ]
it = i3∗t otherwise
The proof follows the same steps as proposition 5.4. This policy function has features
similar to the previous case. There is an area where the interest rate is completely fixed and
another where there is partial adjustment. Also, the coalitions are made with member 2, who
has preferences closer to the agenda setter. However, the direction of the smoothing is different.
For example, for positive expected inflation, in the smoothing area the interest rate change
more than the optimal for member 3.
In this model we have interest rate smoothing when the agenda setter is either the first
or the third member, and the reaction function is non-linear on the lagged interest rate and
expected inflation. An important issue in this model is to determine if this non-linear policy rule
can guarantee the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. The following proposition
shows that the determination properties of the rational expectations equilibrium are satisfied.
Proposition 6 A sufficient condition for the determinacy of a rational expectations equilib-
rium with the reaction functions described in propositions (5.4) and (5.5) is that φ1 < 1+21+βλϕ .
The proof is in the appendix D. The intuition behind this is that, as the response in the
reaction function to expected inflation is bounded between the optimal response for members
1 and 3. And also, since each of those optimal responses satisfy the conditions for the existence
of an equilibrium, this also guarantees the existence of the equilibrium in the context of voting
on a MPC. From the political economy equilibrium it can be some sluggishness on the response
of the interest rate, but this response always will be high enough in order to control inflation.
4 Economic Equilibrium
In this section we solve for the rational expectations equilibrium of inflation and output gap,
given the interest rate reaction function of proposition (5.4). However, since the reaction
function is non-linear and the solution doesn’t have a closed solution, we need to approximate
it by a non-linear method.
4.1 Methodology
We obtain a numerical solution to the rational expectations problem using a collocation
method, which allows us to obtain an approximate solution of the problem with a high degree
of accuracy. The collocation method consists on finding a function that approximates the value
of the policy functions of the problem at a finite number of specified points14. This sub-section
describes the procedure we have used. The system of endogenous equations is the following:
xt = −ϕ [it − Etpit+1] + Etxt+1
pit = λxt + βEtpit+1 + ut
it = f (Etpit+1, it−1)
14See Judd (1998) and Miranda and Fackler (2002) for discussion on collocation methods.
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for the IS, the AS and the non-linear reaction function. The system can be written as:
F (Xt, Et (Xt+1) , St) = 0 (5)
where Xt = [xt, pit, it] are the endogenous variables and St = [ut, it−1] are the state variables,
that evolves according to:
St+1 = g (Xt, et) = [ρut−1 + et, it−1] (6)
We approximate the expected value of the rational expectations solution of the model as a
non-linear function on the states:
EXt+1 = Z (St) (7)
which is unknown. The rational expectations equilibrium satisfies:
F (Xt, Z (St) , St) = 0 (8)
St+1 = g (Xt, et)
The collocation method consists on finding a function of the states, Φ (St)1xn, evaluated in at
Snx1 nodes15 to approximate Z (St) by:
Z (S) = Φ (S)C (9)
where C is a nx1 matrix of coefficients. We need to solve for the matrix of coefficients C in
(9) such that satisfy (8). We use linear splines evaluated at 200x200 points as a basis for the
projection method. To calculate the expected value we use numerical integration based on
Gauss-Legendre quadrature evaluated at 5 points. We select splines as the basis function in
order to have enough flexibility in the approximation function to capture the non-linearities
of the solution. Similarly, we choose to approximate the expected value of the endogenous
variable because it is smoother than the solution for the endogenous variable.
The algorithm has two steps:
Step 1: Since the interest rate reaction function is non-differentiable in the thresholds which
makes difficult to apply the numerical methods to solve for (9), we use a first guess the
following non-linear function for the interest rate:
it = f (Etpit+1, it−1) = i
1∗
t −
(
i1∗t − it−1
) (
2i2∗t − i1∗t − it−1
)
i2∗t − i1∗t
exp
(
−τ
(
i2∗t − it−1
i2∗t − i1∗t
)2)
where i1∗t and i2∗t are member’s 1 and 2 optimal rates, and τ is chosen such that it minimises the
approximation error. We select this non-linear form, because it captures many of the properties
of the original reaction function: the values of the reaction function at the thresholds and at
extreme values are the same. It also preserves the shape of the original reaction function, but
it is smoother at the kinks. We compare the original with the smoothed reaction function in
the following graph:
As we can see, this smoothed reaction function captures the two characteristics of the
original one: lagged dependence and modest response. Features that we want to evaluate in a
general equilibrium framework.
15The system is evaluated at n = n1 ∗ n2 nodes, n1 and n2 for the state space of ut and it−1, respectively.
14
Figure 4: Interest rate reaction function (original vs. smoothed function)
Step 2: We use the solution for Z (S) from step 1 as a first guess for the real piecewise reaction
function and estimate it again the policy function using the collocation method.
The algorithm converges after a total of 140 iterations with a degree of tolerance of 10E−8.
We consider the following parameterisation: the discount factor β = 0.98, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution ϕ = 1/5, the slope of the Philips Curve λ = 0.2, the preference
parameters for member 1 and 2 are α1 = 0.5 and α1 = 1, the autocorrelation of the ”cost-
push” shock is ρ = 0.75 and its shock is normally iid with mean 0 and standard deviation of
0.01.
4.2 Policy functions
In this subsection we describe the solution of the endogenous variables as a function of the
state variables, ut and it−1, We focus on the effects that the interactions within the MPC
have on the interest rate and expected inflation. As we see in the next graphs, the political
equilibrium problem generates lagged dependence, lower response to shocks and an increase in
expected inflation.
Figure 5.5 shows the policy function for the interest rate. We show in the panel on the left
the interest rate as a function of the lagged interest rate for different values of the cost-push
shocks. It shows that the interest rate has areas where it is independent of its lagged values,
but there are areas where the response depends on its lagged value, when such lagged value
15
is close to the optimal. Also, these areas increase the higher the size of the shocks. Similarly,
we show in the panel on the right the interest rate as a function of the cost-push shocks for
different values of the lagged interest rate. We observe that there is no interest rate smoothing
when the initial interest rate is close to its neutral value (that is it−1 = 0). However, there is
a lower response when the interest rate is closer to its optimal value.
Figure 5: Interest rate policy function.
In the model the MPC takes as given expected inflation because there is a lack of com-
mitment. However, the interactions within the MPC generate interest rate smoothing and the
economic agents internalise this, which also has an effect in expected inflation. In the next
graph we compare the expected inflation policy function of our the model with that of the single
unconstrained policymaker. We show that the inertial behaviour of the interest rate increases
expected inflation proportional to the size of the cost-push shock, but independently on the
lagged interest rate. Under our benchmark parameterisation, a cost push shock has
an additional effect on expected inflation of 4.5 percent. This effect is independent of
the lagged interest rate, because the solution takes into account the distribution of the shocks,
which smoothes the effects of the shocks. As economic agents internalise that the decisions of
the MPC have an inertial component, they consider this effect in their expectations. There-
fore, the more heterogeneous the preferences in an MPC are, the effect cost-push shocks on
expected inflation.
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Figure 6: Change in expected inflation (benchmark model vs. MPC model)
4.3 Impulse response to ”cost-push” shocks.
Figure 5.7 shows the effect of a shock of 1 standard deviation in the cost-push shock, for
different values of the initial interest rate and for the case of the unconstrained policymaker.
The initial interest rate takes values that can be high (3%), medium (2.5%) or low (2%). We
see that the expected response of the interest rate is different depending on the starting point.
If the interest rate is close to the optimal, it almost doesn’t change. However, for the case
when the initial interest rate is low, the change is higher and closer to the unconstrained case.
For the intermediate value, the new rate is in between. We can also see that this effect is
transitory, as in period 2 the response is very similar for the four cases. However, since this is
the expected path of the interest rate, it is taking into account that other shocks would arrive
in the next period, which reduces the expected effect of interest rate smoothing.
Similarly, figure 5.8 shows the expected responses for inflation and output gap. We can
observe here the trade-off between output and inflation volatility. The higher the initial in-
terest rate, the more interest rate smoothing and the less volatility of output in relation with
inflation.
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Figure 7: Impulse response to a cost-push shock: interest rate
5 Empirical Implications
The model that we develop in section 5.3 has some empirical implications. In this section we
analyse if those implications are consistent with what is observed in the data. According to
the model, more interest rate smoothing will be observed when the preferences among MPC
members are more unequal, the agenda setter has preferences that are not in the median of
the MPC members, and the size of the shocks is small. Moreover, this result comes from the
assumption that the agenda setter can influence other members and there is an strategic game
within the MPC. We analysed in this section whether these stylised facts are consistent with
the path of the official rates for the USA, UK, EMU, Canada, Sweden and Switzerland, and
with the published voting record of the Bank of England.
Stylised fact 1: Agenda setter influence on the other members
When the MPC members vote, they express their own view about the economy. How-
ever, we argue that in the voting process, the agenda setter can influence the votes of some
members to obtain a policy that is closer to its own optimum. Also, the other members in-
fluence the decision of the agenda setter, because she needs the votes of other members to
have the policy approved. The final outcome in the voting process is a political equilibrium.
There are some open questions about this: Does this strategic behaviour take place? Has the
Chairman/Governor/President of the MPC more power and influence than her peers?
Regarding the first question, we can see from the voting record of the MPC at the Bank
of England that in almost all cases, from when the MPC started in July 1997 until May 2006,
the final policy outcome is the same as the voting record for the Governor16 . In other words,
16The exception was the meeting of August 2005, in which the Governor – Mervyn King
invited members to vote on the proposition that the repo rate should be reduced by 25 basis
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Figure 8: Impulse response to a cost-push shock: inflation and output gap
the agenda setter never loses. This indicates a strategic behaviour from the agenda setter, in
order to obtain the coalition needed to have a policy passed.
Also, there is evidence that the person in charge of the MPC meeting has more power and
can influence other members’ decisions; however the final product is a political equilibrium. We
borrow some quotes made by Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2006): Laurence Meyer, Board Gover-
nor of the FOCM from 1996 to 2002, remarks on ”the chairman’s disproportionate influence on
FOMC decisions” and on ”his efforts to build consensus around his policy recommendations”17.
Similarly, Sherman Maisel, who was a member of the Board during Burns’ chairmanship also
points out that ”while the influence of the Chairman is indeed great, he does not make policy
alone”18. Then, the interest rate decisions come from the interaction between the agenda setter
ant the other members of the MPC.
Stylised fact 2: Heterogeneity in the preferences
point. Five members of the committee vote in favour, whilst the other four members, among
them the Governor, preferred to maintain the rate.
17Meyer (2004), p.50.
18Maisel (1973), p.124.
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The model relies on the assumption that MPC members have different preferences. This
heterogeneity, together with strategic behaviour of the agenda setter, causes interest rate
smoothing. How heterogeneous are the preferences among members? Do they really think
differently? We take as an indicator of this heterogeneity the dissenting record of each member
with respect to the agenda setter. We construct this indicator using the information of the
voting record for the Bank of England, which is available for the period since the MPC was
established in July 1997.
Gerlach-Kristen (2003) analyses the voting record of the BoE since the introduction of
the MPC. She characterise the MPC member in four groups: the first group, the agenda
setter, always vote with the majority; the second group, the ”doves”, when dissenting always
favoured a level of interest rates lower than that set by the majority; the third group, the
”hawks”, always favoured a tighter monetary policy when dissenting; and the fourth group
doesn’t show a systematic preference to higher or lower rates. We can classify the members of
the third (second) group as those that are more (less) conservative than the agenda setter.
In table 5.1 and 5.2 we classify the MPC members in the four categories as Gerlach-
Kristen (2003a) for both, the governorship of Sir Edward George and Mr. Mervyn King. For
this classification we consider if the preferred rate when dissenting was higher or lower than
the voted rate, and how frequent they dissent. We have considered only those members with
at least ten votes in the record and those that show systematic preferences to either lower or
higher rates. Also, we have also classified the members as internal or external depending on
the way they are appointed19.
Table 5.1 shows the classification during the Governorship of Sir Edward George from July
1997 to June 2003, and table 5.2 for the Governorship of Mr Mervyn King from July 2003 to
June 2006. The members are classified by its conservativeness degree, being those at the top
the more conservative20
According to this classification, we can see some differences on MPC members preferences
across sub-samples. First, Sir George has been on average closer to the median preferences
than Mr. King does. Second, we can see more dispersion among MPC member’s preferences
during Mr King’s governorship than during Sir Edward George’s Governorship. Third, the
MPC members internally appointed show a tendency to be more conservative than those
appointed externally. According to these features, our model predicts under Mr. King’s
governorship, ceteris paribus, more interest smoothing than under Sir King’s governorship.
Effectively, during Mr King’s governorship, the official rate has been maintained 80 percent of
the time, in comparison to 68 percent in Sir Edward George’s governorship.
19The MPC at the Bank of England was established in June 1997. It has nine members, five
full-time Bank executives (the Governor and two Deputy Governors, the Chief Economist and
the Markets Director) and four external members, who are appointed for a three-year term by
the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
20For instance, according our classification Sir Budd has been the most conservative during
Sir George Governorship, since he has preferred proportionally more times a higher rate than
the Governor.
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Frequency of which for
of dissents higher rate Appointment
The most conservative
Sir Alan Budd 22.2% 100.0% External
John Vickers 17.9% 100.0% Internal
Mervyn King 16.2% 100.0% Internal
Charles Goodhart 8.3% 100.0% External
Paul Tucker 7.7% 100.0% Internal
Sir Edward George (Governor) 0.0% 0.0% Internal
Charles Bean 2.9% 0.0% Internal
Kate Barker 11.5% 0.0% External
Sushil Wadhwani 35.1% 0.0% External
DeAnne Julius 28.9% 0.0% External
Christopher Allsopp 29.7% 0.0% External
Marian Bell 25.0% 0.0% External
The least conservative
Table 1: Classification MPC members: Sir George’s governorship
Frequency of which for
of dissents higher rate Appointment
The most conservative
Sir Andrew Large 25.8% 100.0% Internal
Paul Tucker 11.4% 100.0% Internal
Rachel Lomax 2.9% 100.0% Internal
Mervyn King (Governor) 0.0% 0.0% Internal
Kate Barker 2.9% 0.0% External
Richard Lambert 3.0% 0.0% External
Charles Bean 8.6% 0.0% Internal
David Walton 9.1% 0.0% External
Marian Bell 12.5% 0.0% External
Stephen Nickell 25.7% 11.1% External
The least conservative
Table 2: Classification MPC members: Mr. King’s governorship
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Stylised fact 3: Dispersion of preferences and interest rate smoothing
The model predicts that the more heterogeneous the preferences are, if the agenda setter
is not the median member, ceteris paribus will be more interest rate smoothing. To analyse
this fact, we compare the paths of the official interest rate for the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB). We expect those economies to have similar paths
for interest rate decisions, since the main trading partners for Switzerland are the members of
the EMU and those economies are hit by similar shocks. However, the pattern of the official
interest rate for the SNB is more dynamic than for the ECB. On average, the changes of the
interest rate had a duration of five months for the SNB in comparison to seven months in the
ECB. Also, the SNB has changed the interest rate by higher amounts than the ECB, the mode
in the change of the interest rate is 0.5 percent for the SNB in contrast to 0.25 percent for the
ECB. This would be explained by how the MPCs are formed in both central banks. At the
ECB, the Governing Council is formed by the six members of the Executive Board, plus the
governors of all the national central banks (NCBs) from the 12 euro area countries, while at
the SNB, the Governing Board in charge of monetary policy decisions is formed of only three
members.
In table 5.3 we show some rough indicators about the dynamics of the official interest rate
for six countries. The first indicator is the average duration of a change in the interest rate;
we expect that the easier it is to have an agreement within the MPC, the lower the interest
rate smoothing and the more frequent the adjustment in the rate. The second indicator is the
mode of the change in the interest rate, the easier it is to have an agreement within the MPC,
the higher the changes in the interest rates.
Country Data since:
Change Rate
Mode
Avg. duration
(Months)
Number of
members
MPC
Number of
meetings
per year
Canada Abr-96 0.25 2.4 6 8
United Kingdom Jun-97 0.25 3.3 9 12
USA Ene-96 0.25 3.3 12 8
Switzerland Ene-00 0.50 5.4 3 12
EMU Ene-01 0.25 7.0 18 11
Sweden Jun-94 0.25 2.2 6 8-9
Table 3: Dynamics of Official Interest Rate
According to the first indicator, Canada and Sweden have the more active central banks,
where a change in the interest rate lasts on average two months, followed by the United King-
dom and the USA with three months. While according to the second indicator, Switzerland is
more active with a mode in the changes of the interest rate of 0.5 percent, a difference from
the other countries whose interest rates usually change by 0.25 percent. Both indicators also
suggest that the central bank with more interest rate smoothing is the ECB, which changes
the interest rate every seven months on average, at steps of 0.25 percent. As we mentioned
before, these results are related to the composition of the MPC. The MPC in Switzerland has
only 3 members, and Canada and Sweden 6; in contrast to the MPC in the USA and the EMU,
which they have 12 and 18, respectively. The more members an MPC has, the more likely that
their the preferences will differ and the more difficult it is to have an agreement.
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6 Conclusions
This paper helps to explain the existing puzzle in the optimal monetary policy literature of in-
terest rate smoothing: why in practice do central banks change the interest rate less frequently
than the theory predicts? In doing this, we extend the New Keynesian Monetary Policy litera-
ture relaxing the assumption that the decisions are taken by a single policy maker, considering
instead that monetary policy decisions are taken collectively in a committee. We introduce a
Monetary Policy Committee whose members have different preferences between output and in-
flation stabilisation and have to vote on the level of the interest rate. Also, there is one member
in charge of setting the agenda of the meeting, which can be the Chairman/Governor/President
of the MPC.
We explain interest rate smoothing from a political economy point of view, in which MPC
members face a bargaining problem on the level of the interest rate. In this framework, the
interest rate is a non-linear reaction function on the lagged interest rate and the expected
inflation. This result comes from a political equilibrium in which there is a strategic behaviour
of the agenda setter with respect to the other MPC members in order to maximise his own
policy objective.
According to the model, there is not such interest rate smoothing when the agenda setter
is the member with median preferences. As in the median voter theorem, she can always get
a coalition to have her most preferred (lagged independent) interest rate. However, when the
agenda setter is either one of the most or the least conservative members, it will be interest
rate smoothing from a political economy point of view. Also, interest rate smoothing is higher
when the preferences among the MPC members are more heterogeneous.
The size of the shocks is also important for interest rate smoothing. We find that the
interest rate will adjust in the same magnitude as in the single policymaker case when the size
of the shocks is high enough. However, when the size of the shocks is of intermediate size,
we have found that the interest rate adjusts partially in order to form a coalition between the
agenda setter and at least one of the other two members. Also, when the size of the shocks is
small, it is preferred to maintain the interest rate unchanged.
We present this explanation of interest rate smoothing as an alternative approach in order
to reproduce altogether both features documented by the empirical evidence of interest rate
smoothing: the modest response of the interest rate to inflation and the lagged dependence.
These are features that other models fail to reproduce at the same time. Our model also
provides a theoretical framework on how disagreement among policy makers can slow the
adjustment on interest rates and on ‘menu costs’ in interest rate decisions.
We also present some evidence based on the official interest rate path for five central banks
and the voting record at the Bank of England. We show that this information is consistent with
the assumptions of the model and with the results. We observe in the data that central banks
whose members have more heterogeneous preferences adjust the interest rate less frequently,
as in the case of the European Central Bank and the FED. Central banks with fewer members
adjust the interest rate more aggressively, as in the case of the Swiss National Bank, the Bank
of Canada and the Bank of Sweden. Also, according to the voting records at the Bank of
England, there is also evidence of heterogeneity in the voting preferences among the members
of the MPC, which is positive related to the degree of interest rate smoothing.
We do some quantitative exercises to show how interest rate smoothing in our model affect
the economic equilibrium. We show that interest rate smoothing increases the effects of cost-
push shocks on expected inflation by 4.5 percent given our benchmark calibration. As economic
agents internalise the inertial component of the MPC decisions, they also consider this effect
23
when forming expectations.
.
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7 Appendix: Proof of propositions
7.1 Proof of proposition 5.1:
We divide the proof in two steps: first the policy-maker chooses xt and pit to maximise her
welfare subject to the aggregate supply. Then, conditional on the optimal values of xt and pit,
she determines the value of it implied by the IS.
The first step of the policymaker’s problem is given by maximising the bellman equation:
max
{xt,pit}
Wt = −12
[
αx2t + pi
2
t
]
+ βEtWt+1
subject to
pit = λxt + βEtpit+1 + ut
Since the policymaker cannot credibly manipulate beliefs in the absence of commitment, she
takes private sector expectations as given when solving her optimisation problem. Then, condi-
tional on the policymaker’s optimal rule, the private sector forms beliefs rationally. Therefore,
the policymaker takes EtWt+1 and βEtpit+1as given in her optimisation problem.
The solution to the first stage problem yields the following optimally condition:
xt = −λ
α
pit (1)
According to this condition, whenever inflation is above target, the policymaker contracts
demand below capacity by raising the interest rate; and vice versa when it is below target.
The aggressiveness of the policymaker depends positively on the gain in reduced inflation per
unit of output loss, λ, and inversely on the relative weight placed on output losses α.
In order to obtain the reduced for expression for xt and pit, we combine the first order
condition with the PC, and then impose that private sector expectations are rational to obtain:
xt = −$ut (2)
pit =
α
λ
$ut
where $ = λ
λ2+α(1−βρ) is a decreasing function of the preference parameter α. From the second
step, the optimal feedback policy for the interest rate is found by inserting the desired value
of xt in the IS:
it = rnt + φpiEtpit+1
where φpi = 1 +
(1−ρ)λ
ρϕα > 1.
7.2 Proof of proposition 5.2:
Replace the IS and the AS in the welfare function of member j and operate:
W jt (it) = −
1
2
{
αj [−ϕ (it − Etpit+1 − rnt ) + Etxt+1]2
+ [λ (−ϕ (it − Etpit+1 − rnt ) + Etxt+1) + βEtpit+1 + ut]2
}
+ βW
j
t+1 (3)
Subtract the welfare function evaluated at it−1 :
W jt (it)−W jt (it−1) = −
1
2

αjϕ (it − it−1)
[
ϕ (it + it−1)
−2
(
ϕ
(
Etpit+1 + r
n
t +
1
ϕ
Etxt+1
)) ]
+λϕ (it − it−1)
[
λϕ (it + it−1)−
2
(
λϕ
(
Etpit+1 + r
n
t +
1
ϕ
Etxt+1
)
+ βEtpit+1 + ut
) ]
 (4)
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factorise ϕ (it − it−1) and rearrange the terms that are similar:
W jt (it)−W jt (it−1) = −
1
2
ϕ (it − it−1)

(
αj + λ2
)
ϕ (it + it−1)
−2 (αj + λ2) [ϕ(Etpit+1 + rnt + 1ϕEtxt+1)]
−2λ (βEtpit+1 + ut)
 (5)
Member j optimal rate satisfies:
x∗jt = −
λ
αj
pijt (6)
also the optimal rate for member j is
ij∗t = r
n
t + Etpit+1 −
1
ϕ
(
xjt − Etxt+1
)
(7)
replace (7) in (5) and factorise the term
(
αj + λ2
)
, we obtain:
W jt (it)−W jt (it−1) = −
1
2
(
αj + λ2
)
ϕ (it − it−1)
{
ϕ (it + it−1)
−2 (ϕij∗t + xjt)− 2 λαj+λ2 (βEtpit+1 + ut)
}
(8)
make use of the AS and (6) to eliminate some terms. The condition can be written by:
W jt (it)−W jt (it−1) = −
1
2
ϕ2
(
αj + λ2
)
(it − it−1)
{
(it + it−1)− 2ij∗t
}
(9)
We have that W jt (it) =W
j
t (it−1) when either it = it−1 or it = 2i
j∗
t − it−1 = ijt
7.3 Proof of proposition 5.4
Let’s analyse the case when Etpit+1 > 0, the proof for the opposite case is similar. When
inflation expectations are positive, we have the following ordering for each member preferred
interest rate:
i1∗t > i
2∗
t > i
3∗
t
We will analyse three possible cases: when the agenda setter can set the interest rate equal
to her most preferred rate (i1∗t ), to the participation rate of either member 2 (i2t ) or 3 (i3t ), or
the status-quo (it−1). Case 1: when member 2 or member 3 accept agenda setter’s preferred
rate (i1∗t )? The utility of member j in comparison with the status quo is:
W jt
(
i1∗t
)−W jt (it−1) = −12ϕ2 (αj + λ2) (i1∗t − it−1){(i1∗t + it−1)− 2ij∗t }
This is positive for member 2 when it−1 < 2i2∗t − i1∗t < i2∗t < i1∗t or when it−1 > i1∗t . Similarly,
this is positive for member 3 when it−1 < 2i3∗t − i1∗t < i3∗t < i1∗t or when it−1 > i1∗t . Then, since
i3∗t < i2∗t , when either it−1 ≤ 2i2∗t − i1∗t or it−1 > i1∗t at least one member will accept i1∗t . Case
2: when the agenda setter will prefer to attract the vote of member 2 with i = i2 instead of
the vote of member 3 with i = i3?
Compare the utility of the agenda setter under both rates:
WAt
(
i2t
)
−WAt
(
i3t
)
= −2ϕ2 (αA + λ2) (i2∗t − i3∗t ) {(i2∗t + i3∗t − i1∗t )− it−1}
= (−) (+) (?)
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She will prefer to attract the votes of member 2 with i = i2 when it−1 > i2∗t +i3∗t −i1∗t , otherwise
she will prefer to attract the votes of member 3 with i = i3.
The agenda setter will always prefer to set i1∗t . However, when it is not possible to obtain
the votes for i1∗t , she can obtain the votes of either member 2 or 3 setting the participation
rate. But, we still need to compare if the agenda setter can be better-off with the status quo
than with the participation rate. As the agenda setter has the first moving advantage, she can
influence the votes of the other members if she prefer to maintain the rate unchanged. Case
3: when the agenda setter prefer the status quo to either i2 or i3 ? Compare the utility of the
agenda setter under both cases:
WAt
(
ijt
)
−WAt (it−1) = −2ϕ2
(
αA + λ2
) (
ij∗t − it−1
){
ij∗t − i1∗t
}
for j = 2 : WAt
(
i2t
)
< WAt (it−1) when it−1 > i2∗t . Similarly, for j = 3 : WAt
(
i3t
)
<
WAt (it−1) when it−1 > i3∗t .
Then, when i2∗t < it−1 < i1∗t : the agenda setter will prefer the status quo to rate necessary
to obtain the votes.
In the remaining area (2i2∗t − i1∗t < it−1 < i2∗t ), since 2i2∗t − i1∗t > i2∗t + i3∗t − i1∗t , the agenda
setter can attract the votes of member 2 setting it = i2t . This define four areas of the interest
rate reaction function when Etpit+1 > 0.
7.4 Proof of proposition 5.6
Consider F as the forward operator, the Phillips curve equation and the IS equation can be
expressed as:
(1− βF )pit = λxt + ut (10)
(1− F )xt = −ϕ (it − Fpit) (11)
where it is function of expected inflation. Multiply (10) by (1− F ) and subtract (11):
(1− F ) (1− βF )pit + λϕ (it − Fpit) = (1− F )ut (12)
In order to have a stable rational expectations equilibrium, we need that the roots of F in
the left hand side of (12) being outside the unit circle.
Let’s analyse first, the determinacy for member-j preferred policy rule:
i∗t = φ
jEtpit+1 = φjFpit
The condition for determinacy is that root to the problem
λϕ
(
φj − 1)F = − (1− F ) (1− βF ) (13)
being outside the unit circle. The value of φj at the boundary F = 1 is φj = 1. Similarly, the
value at the boundary F = −1 is φj = 1+21+βλϕ . Then, any value of φj ∈
[
1, 1 + 21+βλϕ
]
satisfies
the determinacy condition. As φ1 > φ2 > φ3 > 1, a sufficient condition for determinacy is that
φ1 < 1 + 21+βλϕ .
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To analyse the roots of F in (12) for the policy rule in proposition (5.4) or (5.5), note that
it is bounded by preferred rate for member 1 and 3,that is: it ∈
[
φ3Fpit, φ
1Fpit
]
. Then[−q (F ) + λϕ (φ3 − 1)F ]pit ≤ q (F )pit + λϕ (it − Fpit) (14)
≤ [q (F ) + λϕ (φ1 − 1)F ]pit
where we have defined the polynomial q (F ) ≡ − (1− F ) (1− βF ). In the following figure we
graph the polynomial q (F ) and the two lines λϕ
(
φ3 − 1)F and λϕ (φ1 − 1), which satisfy
the determinacy condition. The intersection of each line with q (F ) give the value for the root
of F . On the other hand, the root for the policy function it is located on the segment of
q (F ) between both lines. Also, note that any point in that segment satisfies the determinacy
condition, and the exact position will depend on the last period interest rate.
Figure 1: Determinacy condition
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